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MARYLAND'S OUTDATED STATUTE RESTRICTING 
LABOR INJUNCTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jeffrey P. Ayrest 
Kathleen 0. Gavintt 
Picture this scene. Hundreds of anti-abortionists picket a Maryland 
hospital's emergency room entrance. The picketers link arms to block 
ingress and egress. They impede ambulances, threaten patients and visi-
tors, throw objects, and jostle physicians and nurses. Can a court enjoin 
such conduct, immediately and without notice to adverse parties? 
Certainly. 1 
Change one fact in this hypothetical. Instead of anti-abortionists, 
the picketers are striking hospital workers. Does the result change? Yes, 
the result changes dramatically because of the Maryland Anti-Injunction 
Act (the Act). 2 Owing to this statute, an ex parte injunction is not per-
mitted, and a temporary restraining order cannot effectively become en-
forceable until forty-eight hours after its issuance "no matter how loudly 
the other facts seem to cry out" for immediate relief. 3 
The Maryland Anti-Injunction Act or "Yellow Dog Act" consists 
of thirteen sections of the Maryland Annotated Code, article 100, sec-
tions 63 through 75, and was approved by the General Assembly more 
than fifty years ago.4 Modeled after the federal anti-labor injunction stat-
t B.A., 1974, Harvard College; J.D., with high honors, 1977, George Washington Uni-
versity; Partner, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, Baltimore, Maryland; Member, Dis-
trict of Columbia and Maryland Bars. 
tt B.A., 1983, University of Virginia; J.D., with honors, 1986, University of Maryland 
School of Law; Associate, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, Baltimore, Maryland; 
Member, Maryland Bar. 
1. See, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 
(1968) (relying upon Milk Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 
294 (1941) and Hospital Workers, District 1199E v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 293 Md. 
343, 349 n.l, 444 A.2d 448, 451 n.l (1982)); Mo. RULE BB72 (ex parte injunction); 
Note, The Enforcement of the Right of Access in Mass Picketing Situations, 113 U. 
PA. L. REV. 111, 116-17 (1964). 
2. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins, 293 Md. 343, 444 A.2d 448, discussed in Sykes, A Modest 
Proposal for a Change in Maryland's Statutes Quo, 43 Mo. L. REv. 647, 652 (1984). 
Mr. Sykes argues that the court of appeals reasonably could have held in Johns 
Hopkins that nonprofit hospitals are not covered by this Maryland statute and can 
obtain immediate ex parte injunctions. /d. 
3. Hospital Workers, District 1199E v. Lafayette Square Nursing Center, Inc., 34 Md. 
App. 619, 631, 368 A.2d 1099, 1107 (1977); see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, 
§ 68(7)-(8) (1985). The general procedural rules applicable to injunctions do not 
apply in labor disputes covered by this Maryland statute. See Mo. RULE BB71(b). 
4. Act of April 13, 1935, ch. 574, §§ 65-77, 1935 Md. Laws 1194. The "Yellow Dog 
Act" title refers specifically to section 64 of article 100. A yellow dog contract is an 
agreement "by which [the] employer requires [the] employee to sign an instrument 
promising as [a) condition that he will not join a union during its continuance, and 
will be discharged if he does join." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (5th ed. 
1979)(citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 
Colo. 25, 38, 101 P.2d 436, 443 (1940)). Such contracts were a popular anti-union 
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ute5 (the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932),6 the Maryland Anti-Injunc-
tion Act is referred to colloquially as Maryland's "Little Norris-La 
Guardia Act. " 7 
In general, the Little Norris-La Guardia Act removes from equity 
jurisdiction in Maryland most labor-related controversies. 8 It also im-
poses severe procedural strictures in those few labor disputes- princi-
pally involving violence and threats of violence - where injunctions are 
permitted.9 The harshest procedural stricture of the Act is its require-
ment that forty-eight hours elapse after the issuance of a temporary re-
straining order before it becomes effective, a stricture which is not 
contained in the federal Norris-La Guardia Act. 10 
The time has come to overhaul Maryland's Little Norris-La 
Guardia Act. Labor relations have changed dramatically since 1935. 
Unions are now as institutionalized as banks and insurance companies. 
Detailed federal statutory schemes now protect the rights of workers and 
their unions. The "at will" employment rule which, under the common 
law permitted workers to be fired for any or no reason, has been eviscer-
ated in Maryland. 11 Likewise, constitutional protections for picketing 
and other union activities, while still in their embryonic stages in the 
mid-1930s, are now well entrenched. 12 
The labor protection needs that prompted enactment of the Little 
Norris-La Guardia Act in 1935 have since diminished substantially. The 
need remains, however, for judicial flexibility in violent labor disputes, 
organizing device through the 1920s and early 1930s. F. FRANKFURTER & N. 
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 37, 148-49 (1930). Federal law, 29 U.S.C. § 103 
(1982), as well as section 64 of article 100 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 
prohibits such contracts. 
5. Johns Hopkins, 293 Md. at 345, 444 A.2d at 449. 
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987). 
7. See Lafayette Square, 34 Md. App. at 628, 368 A.2d at 1105; Harford County Educ. 
Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Harford Co., 281 Md. 574, 588, 380 A.2d 1041, 1050 
(1977). 
8. There are some exceptions to the Maryland Act. For example, public school 
teacher strikes can be enjoined in Maryland without regard to the Little Norris-La 
Guardia Act. See MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 6-411(b), 6-514 (1989); Harford 
County Educ. Ass'n, 281 Md. at 588-89, 380 A.2d at 1049-50. Likewise, the Act 
probably does not apply to public sector labor disputes generally in Maryland. See 
Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 14 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 732, (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 
No.2, 1944) reprinted in The Daily Record, April 14, 1944, at 3, col. 1; Cohen, The 
Maryland Law of Strikes, Boycotts, and Picketing, 20 MD. L. REv. 230, 255-58 
(1960). But cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (federal 
Norris-La Guardia Act does not apply to public employees); Joint School Dist. No. 
1, City of Wisconsin Rapids v. Wisconsin Rapids Educ. Ass'n, 70 Wis. 2d 292, 234 
N.W.2d 289 (1975) (Wisconsin Little Norris-La Guardia Act does not apply to pub-
lic sector). 
9. See Lafayette Square, 34 Md. App. at 628, 368 A.2d at 1105. 
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (where permitted, a temporary restraining order may 
"be issued without notice"). 
11. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92. 
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with which the public and private sectors are frequented all too often. 13 
When faced with such violence, Maryland employers and the public are 
entitled to the protections of an injunction remedy that is unencumbered 
by the procedural strictures of the Little NorriS-La Guardia Act. The 
Maryland legislature should amend the Little Norris-La Guardia Act to 
reflect these changed needs. 
II. THE STATUTE AND CASES CONSTRUING IT 
A. The History, Purpose and Content of Maryland's Little Norris-La 
Guardia Act 
Maryland's Little Norris-La Guardia Act was passed in 1935 as part 
of the same nationwide lobbying efforts, undertaken in large part by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, that resulted in the federal Norris-La 
Guardia Act. 14 No evidence had ever been produced, however, to show 
that Maryland courts were abusing the labor injunction. 15 Furthermore, 
the Maryland legislature seemingly made little or no independent analy-
sis of the factual underpinnings of the statute. 16 Nonetheless, like its fed-
eral counterpart, the Maryland statute "reflect[ed] the feeling [prevalent] 
in this country during the 1930s that courts of equity were unduly ham-
pering the labor movement by enjoining necessary and proper union ac-
tivities, especially by means of ex parte injunctions." 17 
In a similar vein, the federal statute has been characterized as "the 
culmination of a bitter political, social and economic controversy ex-
tending over half a century." 18 The drastic curtailment of equity juris-
diction embodied in the federal statute reflected the view "that law 
served no useful purpose in labor disputes, save possibly to protect tangi-
ble property and preserve public order." 19 
Only one relatively minor section in the Maryland Act - the provi-
13. A 540 page study of labor violence was published several years ago. See A. 
THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE 
BY COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB (U. of Pa., The Wharton School In-
dustrial Research Unit 1983). The study concludes that "the law as applied has 
been ineffective in curtailing the actuality or the impact of labor violence ... and 
that it will continue to be ineffective until legislative and judicial attitudes change or 
are forced to change .... " /d. at 17. 
14. See Note, Labor Law-State Anti-Injunction Statutes, 16 N.C.L. REV. 38 (1938). 
15. Indeed, the proposition that American courts in general were abusing labor injunc-
tions has been the subject of serious scholarly criticism. See Petro, Injunctions and 
Labor-Disputes: 1880-1932, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1978). 
16. Presumably, since no legislative reports accompany the Maryland statute and the 
Maryland law is patterned so closely after the federal Norris-La Guardia Act and 
other state counterparts, little or no independent factual analysis was undertaken. 
17. Hospital Workers, District l199E v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 293 Md. 343, 345, 444 
A.2d 448, 449 (1982) (quoting Cohen, supra note 8, at 239). 
18. Milk Wagon Drivers, Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 102 
(1940). 
19. A. COX, LAW AND THE NATIONAL POLICY 5 (1960). 
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sion dealing with appellate review20 - has ever been amended in any 
substantive way. In 1957, the following language was deleted from that 
section: "The appeal shall be heard with the greatest possible expedition, 
giving the proceeding precedence over all other matters except other 
matters of the same character."21 That section was again amended in 
1976 to substitute "Court of Special Appeals" as the appellate court of 
initial review. 22 The remainder of the Little Norris-La Guardia Act, 
however, is substantively identical to the version enacted in 1935.23 
The first section of the Maryland Little Norris-La Guardia Act, sec-
tion 63,24 provides that the public policy of the state is to insure that 
negotiations of terms and conditions in the employment context result 
from a voluntary agreement between the employer and its employees. To 
achieve this goal, the section provides that the individual worker must 
have the rights of freedom of association and self-organization in order to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment. 
The various types of employment agreements or arrangements that 
violate public policy are enumerated in section 64 of the Act. 25 First, 
promises between an employer and an employee to join or remain a 
member of a specific employer or labor organization are prohibited. Sec-
ond, neither an employer nor an employee may promise not to join or not 
to remain a member of some specific employer or labor organization. 
Finally, neither an employer nor an employee may promise that he will 
withdraw from the employment relationship in the event that the other 
party joins or remains a member of a specific employer or labor 
organization. 
Section 65 of the Act26 limits the power of the courts to issue labor 
injunctions against persons who engage in various protected activities. 
Those protected activities include: (1) refusing to work; (2) becoming or 
remaining a member of a labor organization; (3) paying or withholding 
strike or unemployment benefits or insurance; (4) lawfully aiding persons 
who are being prosecuted or sued in court; (5) publicly communicating 
the facts or circumstances of the labor dispute by advertising or appear-
ing in public; (6) seeking to patronize or employ any person; (7) assem-
bling peacefully to organize any protected activities; (8) informing people 
20. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 71 (1985). 
21. Act of March 28, 1957, ch. 399, § 42, 1957 Md. Laws 518, 574. 
22. Act of July 1, 1976, ch. 472, § 26, 1976 Md. Laws 1234, 1260. 
23. Section 65 was amended, effective July 1, 1981, to clarify a typographical error. 
The phrase "other monies of things of value" was changed to "other monies or 
things of value" (emphasis added). Act of July 1, 1981, ch. 2, § 3, 1981 Md. Laws 
6, 32. Similarly, in 1986, two colons were changed to semicolons at the end of 
section 65(1) and (2). Act of July 1, 1986, ch. 5, § 1, 1986 Md. Laws 15, 82. Fi-
nally, in 1986, a typographical error was corrected in section 66(1). The phrase, 
"officer, members or agents," was changed to "officers, members, or agents." /d. 
(emphasis added). 
24. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 63 (1985). 
25. /d.§ 64. 
26. /d. § 65. 
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of the intent to engage in such activities; (9) agreeing with others to en-
gage or not to engage in such activities; (10) advising others to do the 
acts described; and (11) doing any of the acts described in concert with 
any other person. 
Section 66 of the Act27 protects officers and their labor organiza-
tions from liability for the wrongful actions of their individual members. 
Officers and their organizations can be held liable, however, if the person 
committing the wrongful act is an officer, member or agent of the organi-
zation, and the organization, after actual notice of the activity, expressly 
authorizes or ratifies such acts. 
Section 67 of the Act28 prohibits generally the issuance of ex parte 
injunctions in labor disputes. The rationale for this rule is that the status 
quo will necessarily be altered by an injunction. In addition, the determi-
nation of facts through affidavits, according to this section, is not as 
trustworthy as facts developed through oral examination of witnesses at 
a hearing. Moreover, section 67 provides that an error in the issuance of 
injunctive relief can create irreparable harm, and that the usual delay in 
appealing the granting of such relief typically is so long that the correc-
tion of an error often is rendered moot. 
Section 6829 is the heart of Maryland's Little Norris-La Guardia 
Act. This section describes when a court may issue injunctive relief in a 
labor dispute and provides specific procedures for issuing that relief. 
First, in many cases, there must be notice, a hearing, and findings of fact 
prior to the issuance of a labor injunction. 30 Second, the moving party 
also must plead and establish all of the following facts: (1) that the un-
lawful acts will continue unless restrained; (2) that substantial and irrep-
arable injuries will be incurred by the moving party unless the relief is 
granted; (3) that the relief requested will be less harmful to the respond-
ing party than the harm that the moving party will suffer if the relief is 
denied; (4) that the court has jurisdiction to enjoin the activity com-
plained of; (5) that the moving party has no adequate remedy at law; (6) 
that the public officers charged with the duty to protect the moving 
party's property have been unable to do so; and (7) that the responding 
party and the police were given due notice of the hearing on the matterY 
Third, the moving party must post a bond to compensate the enjoined 
party for damages resulting from an improper injunction. 32 
Section 68 also contains the forty-eight hour waiting period de-
scribed previously. 33 In essence, that provision mandates that a tempo-
rary restraining order not be enforced, prior to an evidentiary hearing, 
27. Id. § 66. 
28. Id. § 67. 
29. Id. § 68. 
30. Id. 
31. I d. § 68( 1 )-(7). 
32. Id. § 68(10). 
33. /d. § 68(8); see also text accompanying notes 1-3, 9-10 supra. 
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until forty-eight hours have elapsed since its issuance by a court. After 
forty-eight hours, however, section 68 permits the enforcement of a tem-
porary restraining order if the moving party pleads and establishes that 
substantial and irreparable injury is unavoidable. This temporary re-
straining order is effective for a maximum of five days; it is not subject to 
renewal or extension, but in the court's discretion it may be continued 
until a decision is reached if the required evidentiary hearings have com-
menced prior to the expiration of the five-day period. 34 
Section 6935 of the Act requires the moving party to plead and es-
tablish that it has satisfied every obligation imposed on it by law. More-
over, the moving party must make every reasonable effort to settle the 
dispute by negotiation or with the aid of any available arbitration or me-
diation mechanisms. The court, however, is not required to wait for the 
decision of an arbitrator or any other tribunal prior to granting injunc-
tive relief where irreparable injury may occur in the interim. 
Section 7036 of the Act provides that the injunctive relief must be 
specific. Only the parties named in the petition will be bound by any 
injunctive relief issued by the court. Moreover, only those acts cited in 
the petition may be enjoined. 
Section 71 37 of the Act provides that any appeal regarding the issu-
ance of injunctive relief must be made to the court of special appeals. 
Sections 7238 and 7339 of the Act delineate the rights of persons who 
violate an existing injunctive order. Specifically, such persons may be 
guilty of indirect criminal contempt; they are afforded the usual rights of 
bail, notice, and jury trial. In some cases, the violators may request that 
the judge sitting in the injunction proceeding be replaced "if the con-
tempt arises from an attack upon the character or conduct of such 
judge."40 Section 73 imposes a maximum penalty of $100.00 or impris-
onment not to exceed fifteen days for the contempt. 
Section 7441 sets out definitions. In particular, section 74 defines 
broadly "labor disputes," what cases grow out of labor disputes, and who 
is participating in or has an interest in a labor dispute. Finally, section 
7542 of the Act is a severability provision which, if any section of the Act 
is deemed invalid, purports to save the remainder of the Act. 
Particularly in recent years, efforts have been mounted in the Gen-
eral Assembly to amend Maryland's Little Norris-La Guardia Act. All 
of these efforts to date, however, have failed. In 1980, for example, bills 
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 68(9) (1985). 
35. /d. § 69. 
36. /d.§ 70. 
37. /d. § 71. 
38. /d. § 72. 
39. /d. § 73. 
40. /d. § 72(4). 
41. /d. § 74. 
42. /d. § 75. 
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were introduced in both the Senate and the House of Delegates.43 
Neither bill, however, was referred out of committee. In 1981, a senate 
bill was introduced to amend the statute.44 That bill received an unfa-
vorable report from the Economic Affairs Committee. In 1983, a senate 
bill was introduced to repeal and reenact with amendments sections 68, 
69, and 70 of the Act.45 That bill also was not referred out of committee. 
Bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House of Delegates in 
1984,46 however, the 1984 measures did not receive favorable committee 
review. 
Finally, during the 1988 session, the Schaefer Administration con-
sidered introducing legislation aimed specifically at the forty-eight hour 
waiting period.47 The proposed legislation would have permitted imme-
diate temporary restraining orders, without notice, if the court found a 
threat of death, serious bodily harm, or substantial property damage. 
Eventually, however, the Schaefer Administration decided not to intro-
duce this legislation during the 1988 session, and no legislation was pro-
posed on the subject during the 1989 or 1990 sessions. 
B. Cases Construing the Act 
Only a handful of reported cases have construed Maryland's Little 
Norris-La Guardia Act.48 Indeed, more than forty years after the act 
was enacted, the court of special appeals noted "the paucity of Maryland 
cases interpreting the Maryland Act," thus requiring an examination of 
"federal decisions for guidance."49 To date, only four Maryland appel-
late decisions have construed the Act in detail. 
43. S. 914, 1980 Sess. of Maryland Legislature; H.R. 1916, 1980 Sess. of Maryland 
Legislature. 
44. S. 739, 1981 Sess. of Maryland Legislature (vote six to one against enactment). 
45. S. 500, 1983 Sess. of Maryland Legislature. 
46. S. 573, 1984 Sess. of Maryland Legislature; H.R. 785, 1984 Sess. of Maryland 
Legislature. 
47. One of the authors of this article had discussions with Schaefer Administration offi-
cials (and reviewed draft legislation) concerning the forty-eight hour waiting period. 
No legislation, however, was ever introduced during the 1988 session by the 
Admistration. 
48. In two companion Supreme Court cases, Justice Frankfurter construed current sec-
tion 64 to be a "right-to-work" statute. See American Fed'n of Labor v. American 
Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 554 n.12 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Lin-
coln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Section 64(a) outlaws contracts under which an em-
ployee "promises to join or - to remain a member of some specific labor organiza-
tion or organizations .... " If Justice Frankfurter was correct that section 64(a) is a 
"right-to-work" statute, then Maryland (like states such as Virginia) prohibits com-
pulsory union membership. Such state law prohibitions are expressly permitted by 
federal law. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982) (construed in Retail Clerks, Local 1625 
v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963)). But see Beck v. Communications Workers, 
776 F.2d 1187, 1202 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd en bane, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) 
("Maryland ... has no right-to-work law"), aff'd, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
49. Hospital Workers, District 1199E v. Lafayette Square Nursing Center, Inc., 34 Md. 
App. 619, 629, 368 A.2d 1099, 1105 (1977). 
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The first decision, Dolan v. Motion Picture & Television Operators 
Union, 5° held that "where there is a bona fide claim that the Act is inap-
plicable, and the power to grant the ancillary relief depends in great part 
upon the resolution of the jurisdictional question, the trial court 'unques-
tionably' has 'the power to issue a restraining order for the purpose of 
preserving existing conditions pending a decision upon its own 
jurisdiction.' " 51 
The jurisdictional question at issue in Dolan centered upon whether 
a labor-related controversy cc;mstituted a "labor dispute," thereby trig-
gering application of the Act. The controversy involved a "dual union-
ism" problem, where workers wanted to simultaneously belong to two 
different unions. When one union tried to expel these workers, the work-
ers sought an injunction, claiming that any expulsion would contravene 
that union's constitution and bylaws. A Maryland court today might 
well abstain from deciding this dual unionism issue, deferring instead to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 52 
Hence, a Maryland court today might refuse to issue an interim re-
straining order under the facts of Dolan due to a lack of jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the holding of Dolan on the propriety of issuing an injunc-
tion pending a ruling on a trial court's jurisdiction retains vitality. 
The second appellate decision construing the Maryland Act is Tide-
water Express Lines, Inc. v. Freight Drivers & Helpers, Local 557.53 In 
that case, an employer sought to enjoin a work stoppage that constituted 
a breach of the no-strike clause contained in a collective bargaining 
agreement. In deciding whether the work stoppage could be enjoined, 
the court of appeals focused upon section 65(1) of the Act, which prohib-
its injunctions against anyone "[c]easing or refusing to perform any work 
or to remain in any relation of employment regardless of any promise, 
undertaking, contract or agreement to do such work or to remain in such 
employment. ... " 54 
In holding that section 65(1) precludes injunctions against a work 
stoppage in breach of a no-strike clause, the Tidewater Express court 
observed: 
The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and in 
terms prohibits the enjoining of the doing of the things the 
Union and its members are charged with doing. There is no 
claim that fraud or violence or threat of either has raised its 
ugly head. There would seem to be no room for any finding 
other than that the Maryland Legislature had taken away the 
SO. 206 Md. 256, Ill A.2d 462 (1955). 
5 I. /d. at 259, Ill A.2d at 463 (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 
u.s. 258, 290, 310 (1947)). 
52. Compare Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983) 
with Vane v. Nocella, 303 Md. 362, 494 A.2d 181 (1985). 
53. 230 Md. 450, 187 A.2d 685 (1963). 
54. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 65 (1985 & Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). 
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power of the court to issue the injunction sought. 55 
The third appellate decision construing the Little Norris-La 
Guardia Act is Hospital Workers, District 1199E v. Lafayette Square 
Nursing Center, Inc. 56 In that case, striking employees engaged in vio-
lence, threats, and other illegal activity on the picket line. The trial court 
granted the employer's request for injunctive relief after the employer 
established this unlawful conduct. 57 
The court of special appeals held that the Little Norris-La Guardia 
Act did not strip the courts of the equitable power to issue injunctive 
relief. Nevertheless, the court noted that such relief could be issued only 
after a finding that every factor listed in section 68 was met. "If all of 
those facts are found, the injunction may issue. Conversely, if any or 
more is not so found, no injunction may be issued. " 58 According to the 
court of special appeals, the evidence supported the trial court's finding 
that those specific facts were indeed present. Still, the court vacated the 
injunction because compliance with section 69 of the Act was not proven 
by the employer.59 
Section 69 requires the moving party to show that it has complied 
with all obligations imposed by law and has made every reasonable effort 
to settle the dispute by negotiation or other arbitration or mediation pro-
cedures. The court of special appeals in Lafayette Square held that com-
pliance with section 69 must be established by the moving party, 
regardless of the occurrence of violence by strikers, before any injunctive 
relief may issue. As the court noted, "strict compliance with [the Act's] 
terms is mandatory," and "section 69 sets forth a condition precedent to 
equitable relief, that chancellors may not ignore, no matter how loudly 
the other facts seem to cry out for such relief. "60 
The final and most recent Maryland appellate decision construing 
the Little Norris-La Guardia Act is Hospital Workers, District 1199E v. 
Johns Hopkins Hospita/. 61 In that case, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that private, nonprofit hospitals are subject to the provisions of 
the Little Norris-La Guardia Act.62 
As in Lafayette Square, the court of appeals emphasized in Johns 
Hopkins that the Little Norris-La Guardia Act was designed to protect 
the rights of individual employees in labor disputes. Therefore, the court 
adopted a very narrow interpretation of the Act - an interpretation 
55. Tidewater Express, 230 Md. at 453, 187 A.2d at 687. But see Boys Markets, Inc. v. 
Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (federal Norris-La Guardia Act per-
mits federal injunctions against strikes in breach of a no-strike clause). 
56. 34 Md. App. 619, 368 A.2d 1099 (1977). 
57. /d. at 622, 368 A.2d at 1101. 
58. /d. at 628, 368 A.2d at 1105 (emphasis in original). 
59. /d. at 631, 368 A.2d at 1106-07. 
60. /d. 
61. 293 Md. 343, 444 A.2d 448 (1982). 
62. /d. at 360, 444 A.2d at 456. 
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which had been rejected by courts construing similar Little Norris-La 
Guardia acts in such states as New York63 and Pennsylvania.64 Because 
the language of the Act did not indicate any legislative intent to exclude 
nonprofit hospitals from coverage, the court held that such organizations 
are covered by the Act, regardless of the public interest in keeping hospi-
tals open and free from violence during labor disputes. 
In addition to the four appellate decisions discussed above, lower 
courts have construed the Maryland Anti-Injunction Act on several 
occasions in unofficially reported decisions, and have deemed the Act 
inapplicable to cases involving recognitional picketing,65 secondary boy-
cotts, 66 and "retaliatory strikes. " 67 The federal preemption doctrine, 
however, places significant restraints upon the continued usefulness of 
these unreported cases. 68 
Moreover, in Pikesville Electric Co. v. International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, Local 24,69 the trial court issued an injunction under 
circumstances very similar to the more recently decided Lafayette Square 
case, with one important exception. Before issuing an injunction in 
Pikesville Electric, the trial court, as in Lafayette Square, found that the 
seven facts specified in section 68 were present. Unlike Lafayette Square, 
however, the court also found specifically that "the company has not 
failed to make every reasonable effort to settle the labor dispute in ques-
tion by negotiations, that these negotiations have been in good faith and 
that the provisions of . . . section 69 are no bar to the granting of the 
permanent injunction above mentioned."70 
Finally, Cox Distributing Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, 
Local 107,11 is a good example of how strictly the requirements of the 
Little Norris-La Guardia Act have been construed. In Cox, a union en-
gaged in violent recognitional picketing. The employer argued that, be-
cause recognitional picketing is not a labor dispute per se, the Act does 
not apply. After originally granting a temporary restraining order limit-
ing the number of pickets, however, the trial court later held that recog-
nitional picketing is a labor dispute. 72 The court then ruled that the 
63. Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 A.D. 581, 584-85, 300 N.Y.S. 1111, 1117-18 
(1937). 
64. Western Penn. Hosp. v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382, 390, 17 A.2d 206, 210 (1941). 
65. Goldstein v. Bartenders Union, Local 36, 40 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2706 (Baltimore City 
Cir. Ct. 1957). 
66. Wischhusen v. Griffin, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2426, 2432 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 
1953). 
67. Matson Navigation Co. v. Atlantic & Gulf Dist. Seafarers lnt'l Union, 29 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 2031 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1951). 
68. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
69. 58 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2224 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1965). 
70. !d. at 2230-31. Hence, even in light of the later Lafayette Square holding, the in-
junction issued in Pikesville Electric was proper. See also Empire Constr. Co. v. 
Carpenters Dist. Council (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1979) (reported in The Daily Rec-
ord, April 6, 1979, at 4, col. 1.). 
71. 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2215 (Talbot County Cir. Ct. 1958). 
72. Id. at 2218. 
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employer had not satisfied the requirements of the Act, and held that the 
temporary restraining order had to be dissolved. 73 
III. ANACHRONISMS IN THE STATUTE AND THE NEED 
FOR REFORM 
A. The Dramatic Changes in Labor Relations Since 1935 
Labor relations were vastly different in 1935 than they are today. 
Congress had already enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act in 1932, but 
that statute only regulated the issuance of federal injunctions in labor 
disputes. It did not provide substantive protection for the right of em-
ployees to unionize. 74 
The right of railroad employees to unionize was firmly protected 
under federal law by 1926.75 The first real effort at providing a statutory 
mechanism to protect employees outside the railroad industry, the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,76 however, failed miserably.77 
The cornerstone of modern labor-management relations, the Wag-
ner Act, 78 was not enacted until 1935. Moreover, particularly after the 
National Industrial Recovery Act failed, the constitutionality of the 
Wagner Act was very much in doubt until 1937, when the Supreme 
Court upheld the statute. 79 
The Wagner Act protects union organizing activities and provides a 
comprehensive administrative mechanism, through the National Labor 
Relations Board, for rectifying employer infringement upon those activi-
ties.80 Since the enactment of the Wagner Act, unions have proliferated 
73. In reaching this conclusion the court stated: 
For these reasons, this court is compelled to rule that the mandatory con-
ditions required by section 68 of Article 100 have not been complied with 
and therefore that it is without authority to issue an injunction to perma-
nently restrain the outrageous and reprehensible violence, threats of vio-
lence, intimidation and other unlawful conduct. ... 
/d. at 2220. 
74. Similar to section 63, the federal Anti-Injunction Act's policy statement affirmed the 
right of employees to choose freely their bargaining representatives. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (1982). Neither the Maryland nor the federal statute, however, provided any 
governmental mechanisms for protecting those rights. F. DULLES, LABOR IN 
AMERICA 276 (2d rev. ed. 1960). 
75. See Railway Labor Act of 1926 (codified as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-
188 (1982)). The act was declared constitutional in Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brother-
hood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930). 
76. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195. 
77. I. BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS 172-85 ( 1970). A significant portion of 
this statute was later declared unconstitutional in the infamous "sick chicken 
cases." See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542, 
550 (1935). This was one of the decisions which led President Roosevelt to unveil 
his infamous "Court Packing" plan in reaction to the Supreme Court's rulings 
against the constitutionality of several economic and social programs. See J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144-48 (3d ed. 1986). 
78. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (1982). 
79. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
80. See generally I. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 27-30 (2d ed. 1983). 
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and their institutional powers (and coffers) have burgeoned. This protec-
tive mantle of federal law has more than compensated for the fact that 
Maryland law does not generally protect the right of employees to 
unionize. 81 
The United States Constitution also has been an important source of 
protection for peaceful concerted activities, especially since the 1930s. 
This consideration takes on added import given that Maryland's Little 
Norris-La Guardia Act was passed years before the Supreme Court first 
accorded constitutional protection to peaceful picketing.82 Similarly, 
federal labor laws enacted since the 1930s often have preempted, through 
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, state court in-
junctions against peaceful employee activities. 83 
Since 1935, the common law also has made stunning strides in pro-
tecting employee rights.84 Unless an employment contract provided 
otherwise, Maryland workers in 1935 could be fired "at will," for any 
or no reason. That is no longer the case. In 1980, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland recognized a new cause of action for abusive discharge. 
When a termination violates a "clear mandate of public policy," a civil 
remedy is now available in Maryland. 85 Since 1980, even more inroads 
have been made upon the employment-at-will doctrine in Maryland.86 
Juries have rendered multi-million dollar verdicts under such theories, 87 
which Maryland unionized employees are free (in appropriate cases) to 
81. Some states, excluding Maryland, have enacted so-called "Little Wagner Acts." 
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-101 to -111 (1989). A few Maryland employee 
groups, such as public school employees, are protected by state collective bargaining 
statutes. See Mo. Eouc. CODE ANN. §§ 6-409, 6-512 (1989). Such coverage in 
Maryland, however, is the exception rather than the rule. 
82. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941); Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940). 
83. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 
U.S. 180 (1978) (state court injunction action against peaceful trespassory picketing 
can, in some cases, be preempted by federal labor Jaws); Baltimore Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council v. Maryland Port Auth., 238 Md. 232, 208 A.2d 564 (1965) (federal 
preemption doctrine prevented a court from enjoining peaceful labor picketing, even 
assuming that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose). See generally Cox, Labor 
Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972). 
84. These common law theories, of course, supplement the wealth of civil rights statutes 
which have been enacted since the passage of Maryland's Little Norris-La Guardia 
Act. See, e.g., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B (1986 & Supp. 1989). 
85. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 47, 432 A.2d 464, 473 (1981); see 
Abramson & Silvestri, Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge in 
Maryland, lOU. BALT. L. REV. 257, 258 (1981). 
86. For example, an employee handbook or disciplinary policy statements can now give 
rise to a breach of contract claim. Compare Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 61 
Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798, cert. denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985) with 
Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786 (1986), cert. 
denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987). See generally Ayres & Gavin, The 
Workplace Tort Explosion, MD. B.J. (Jan. 1989). 
87. See, e.g., Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985). 
540 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
invoke. 88 
These developments in the field of labor relations provide adequate 
protection to the legitimate interests of unions and employees. Corre-
spondingly, though, illegal labor activities such as picket line violence 
should be governed by the same injunction standards as other types of 
violence. The Maryland Little Norris-La Guardia Act is a dinosaur with 
specific anachronisms in today's world of labor relations. 
B. Specific Shortcomings of the Statute 
In today's climate of intense competition among states to attract 
new business, the mere existence of a Little Norris-La Guardia Act in 
Maryland has important negative repercussions. Twenty-five states have 
Little Norris-La Guardia Acts.89 From Maryland to Texas, however, the 
only other seaboard state with such a statute is Louisiana. As for Mary-
land's neighboring states, only Pennsylvania has such a statute, but it is 
far less stringent than Maryland's. 90 
Even more telling is the number of jurisdictions which, like Mary-
land, effectively prohibit a temporary restraining order from being en-
forceable until at least forty-eight hours after its issuance. The federal 
Norris-La Guardia Act has no such provision,91 and only five states 
other than Maryland-Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Utah and Wisconsin-
do.92 
88. Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 49, 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1988). 
89. In addition to Maryland, the following states have anti-injunction statutes: Arizona 
(ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1808 (1982)); California (CAL CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 527.3 (West 1979)); Colorado (CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-118 (1986)); Connecticut 
(CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-112 (1958)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 380-1 (1985)); 
Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 44-701 (1977)); Illinois (ILL REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, ~ 
2A, § 1 (1986)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN.§ 22-6-1-1 (Burns 1986)); Kansas (KAN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 60-904 (1983)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:841, 844 (West 
1985)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 5 (1988)); Massachusetts (MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 6 (West 1989)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 185.01 (West 1966)); New Jersey (N.J. REv. STAT.§ 2A:15-51 (1987)); New Mex-
ico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-3-1 (1978)); New York (N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807 (Mc-
Kinney 1978)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE§ 34-08-07 (1987)); Oregon (OR. 
REV. STAT. § 662.040 (1987)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206a (Pur-
don 1964)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-10-2 (1986)); Utah (UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 34-19-1 (1988)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.010) (1962)); 
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.56 (West 1988)); and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-7-101 (1987)). Additionally, Puerto Rico has such a statute and District of 
Columbia local courts are bound by the federal Norris-La Guardia Act. See P.R. 
LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 101 (1985); Sheriff v. Medel Elec. Co., 412 A.2d 38 (D.C. 
App. 1980). 
90. Pennsylvania removed mass picketing and violence from the scope of its Little Nor-
ris-La Guardia Act in 1937. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206(d) (Purdon 1964). 
Moreover, the Pennsylvania statute has no forty-eight hour waiting period like 
Maryland's section 68(8). 
91. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
92. See IDAHO CODE § 44-706(f) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:844(6) (West 
1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 5 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-19-5(6) 
(1953); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 103.56 subd. 2 (1988). 
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The forty-eight hour waiting period is potentially the most deleteri-
ous feature of Maryland's Little Norris-La Guardia Act. No matter how 
violent a labor dispute becomes, and no matter how seriously the public 
is harmed by the labor violence, a temporary restraining order is not 
enforceable during this forty-eight hour period. This feature is harmful 
to businesses, harmful to the public, and unnecessary given the realities 
of labor relations today. Moreover, the fact that none of the neighboring 
states with which Maryland competes for new business has such a provi-
sion only serves to exacerbate the deleterious effect of the forty-eight 
hour waiting period. 
Another objectionable feature in Maryland's Little Norris-La 
Guardia Act is section 68( 6). This section requires that a court find, as a 
precondition to injunctive relief, "[t]hat the public officers charged with 
the duty to protect complainant's property have failed or are unable to 
furnish adequate protection." 
Early critics of the federal Norris-La Guardia Act recognized that 
the requirement of section 68(6) "may in some instances, and no doubt 
will, be impossible to sustain."93 Essentially, section 68(6) requires that a 
police official testify in open court that the local police department can-
not do its job. For that reason, practically speaking, the police must 
swallow their pride and admit that an injunction is badly needed before 
this provision can be satisfied by an employer. 
In the alternative, to satisfy this requirement, the employer must 
adopt an adversarial stance with the police. The employer must prove 
that the police cannot do their job even though the police are testifying in 
open court that they can. Since these are the same officers who will be 
"protecting" the employer after the injunction hearing is over (and who 
typically will be enforcing any injunctions), employers face a real di-
lemma because of section 68( 6). 
The ill effects of this dilemma are exacerbated by the fact that 
elected officials have an incentive to put pressure on the police in labor 
injunction cases. "A public official sees many votes on the picket line; 
few in the office."94 Even in cases where this pressure from public offi-
cials does not materialize, police generally are "less willing to curtail ille-
gal conduct on the picket line before an injunction is issued than 
afterward. " 95 Even Professor Witte, a chief proponent of anti-injunction 
legislation in this country, has acknowledged this fact of legal life.96 
This reiuctance on the part of police to enforce the law in labor 
93. See MINORITY REPORT ON NORRIS-LA GUARDIA ACT, S. REP. No. 163, 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 11-12 (1932). 
94. Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Need/or Federal Injunctions, 114 U. PA. 
L. REV. 459, 465 (1966). 
95. Aaron & Levin, Labor Injunctions in Action: A Five-Year Survey in Los Angeles 
County, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 42, 60 (1951). 
96. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, STATE COURT INJUNCTIONS, S. Doc. 
No. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951). In this report, Professor Witte concedes police 
542 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
disputes is enhanced by an "its not a foul unless the referee blows his 
whistle" attitude on the part of union officials. Unions and their mem-
bers generally believe that picket line misconduct "is not illegal until a 
court issues an injunction based on the facts of the particular case."97 
Correspondingly, denial of an injunction request is generally taken by 
picketers as a judicial imprimatur upon the legality of everything which 
has happened previously on the picket line. Such a reaction is especially 
ironic when the injunction is denied because the police have testified that 
they are furnishing the employer with adequate protection. 
A third feature of Maryland's Little Norris-La Guardia Act that is 
objectionable is section 69. As construed by the court of special appeals, 
section 69 requires employers, as a pre-condition to obtaining injunctive 
relief, "to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved 
in the labor dispute in question .... " This provision also requires em-
ployers "to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by 
negotiation or with the aid of any available machinery or governmental 
mediation or voluntary arbitration .... " 
Essentially, this section requires the victim to negotiate with the 
mugger as a precondition to injunctive relief against future muggings. In 
a violent labor dispute, when an employer's very ability to stay in busi-
ness is under attack, the inadequacy of this provision is obvious. More-
over, because federal labor laws closely regulate the negotiating conduct 
of employers toward unions, this section of the Maryland statute is re-
dundant and limits the right of employers and the public to an injunction 
against labor violence.98 Section 69 is particularly difficult to comply 
with when there is no collective bargaining relationship in existence be-
tween the picketed employer and the picketing union-which frequently 
is the case. 99 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As these shortcomings in the application and effect of the Act make 
painfully clear, Maryland's Little Norris-La Guardia Act is in need of 
reform. Provisions such as the forty-eight hour waiting period are im-
practical and unrealistic in today's world of labor relations. Moreover, 
unions are powerful entities that do not need such heavy-handed statu-
tory protections. Finally, such a statute does little to entice prospective 
protection against lawlessness "is often not provided in labor disputes until injunc-
tions are issued." /d. 
97. Note, The Enforcement of the Right of Access, supra note 1, at 116. 
98. Section 69 also may be preempted by federal labor laws. Compare Oil, Chern. & 
Atomic Workers Int'l v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 332 F.2d 64 (lOth Cir. 1964) with 
General Elec. Co. v. Callahan, 294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 369 U.S. 
832 (1962). 
99. Stewart & Townsend, supra note 94, at 485. The inequities inherent in section 69 
have been cogently chronicled in an article discussing the Massachusetts Little Nor-
ris-La Guardia Act. See Kearns, Injunctions Against Mass Picketing- A Gap In 
the Pre-emption Doctrine, 3 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 157 (1962). 
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employers to relocate their businesses in Maryland. For these reasons 
and under all the circumstances, the General Assembly should overhaul 
this anachronistic statute. 
